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EVIDENCE FROM CNBC'S JIM CRAMER'S
MAD MONEY STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS

By Elizabeth Dodson
Department of Finance
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Department of Finance

Abstract:
Mad Money has become one ofthe most popular shows on
CNBC. The host, Jim Cramer, has an outlandish style and
personality that viewers find intoxicating. Cramer's goal for the
show is to make people money. Does he succeed? This paper
finds that investors can expect to gain above-average, riskadjusted returns by following Cramer's stock recommendations
and trading accordingly. These findings challenge the semi~trong fonn market h)pothesis. According to this hypothesis
mrestors should not recogni::e gains trading on public infonnation
~ince it st~tes that the market has already adjusted pricesfor that
uiformatwll. It also contributes to current literature by providing
analysis on the different segments of the Mad Money program
and serving as a jumping-off point for future research on a
possible Jim-Cramer-Mad;6-Money hedge fimd strategy.

Introduction:
CNBC hit a homerun with its decision to put Jim Cramer on
the air. in all of his glory-hurling chairs across the floor,
screa~mng at the came:a. ~nd ripping the heads off ofbull-shaped
stress balls, and that IS m the first 5 minutes. A typical Mad
Money show ~o~sists of Cramer starting off a pick of the day or
week <;r descnbmg recent market news and its possible impacts.
Later m the show, Cramer opens the lines up for callers to run
their stock
picks
by Cramer. During....., this "lightnino-o rou nd" , the
·
.
pace IS _fevenshly fast and "Booyah's" (Cramer's coined phrase
for excitement and also a term of greeting) fill the air. Since its
debut on !\larch 14.2005. Cramer's Mad Money has become one
of the to~ ranked shows on CNBC. The timeslot of 6 PM EST
had ~revto~sly been the lowest-rated slot until Cramer showed
up with a VIsion. His vision was for a show with one simple goal
mak~ people money. According to Derek Hoggett, editor and
pubhshero~Investn:entWizard.com, "JamesCramerisemerging
stock market o-uru
sinceDanDorfmanan d
as the most
.
,· mfluential
,
e
Joe. Granv1He. Can Cramer
· k. . really pro vi· de above -average, ns
adJUSt~d returns for his viewers or is he dangerous to investors'
financ1al health?
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This paper attempts to answer the question of whether Jim
Cramer, utilizing his television venue, provides investors with a
way to gain above-average, risk-adjusted returns. If Cramer is
successful, then these results would challenge semi-strong fonn
market efficiency theory. Semi-strong form market efficiency
states that at any time stock market prices fully reflect all public
infonnation. Following this, investors should not be able to
make better returns than the market trading on information that
is already publicly available. Cramer does not provide investors
with proprietary information. The support he gives for his choice
of stocks comes from a variety of sources such as press releases,
company web sites, market news, and SEC filings. He is a major
proponent of his viewers researching the companies he
recommends before deciding to follow his advice. This paper
contends, however, that regardless of following Cramer's doyour-homework advice, investors can expect to see aboveaverage returns simply by buying when and what he says to buy
and selling when and what he says to sell.
This paper makes two contributions to current literature.
First, it documents holding period returns that would have been
achieved by following Jim Cramer's investment strategy. Second,
this study has implications for future hedge fund strategies.
Perhaps a hedge fund could repeatedly beat its competition in the
growing market for hedge funds by following Cramer's
investment advice and trading accordingly. This paper provides
a jumping off point for other academics to continue the research
and development of the probability and possible effects of a JimCramer-Mad-Money trading strategy. As will be discussed in
Section 2.2 of the Literature Review, one other paper has
attempted to document the results of Cramer's investment
recommendations. This paper, however, takes a different slant
than that of the Northwestern paper by investigating the different
portions of the program (lightning round vs. non-lightning
round) and hypothesizing that the two time periods are statistically
significant from each other.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses current relevant literature and the development of
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the hypotheses for the study. Section III describes the sample
selection and the design for this study. Section IV lays out the
results of the study. Section V provides the results of the
sensitivity analysis. Section VI concludes.

Literature Review and Hypothesis Description:

1. Efficient Market Theory
Semi-strong form market efficiency states that at any time
stock market prices fully reflect all public information. If this is
true, investors should not be able to obtain above-average returns
trading on information after it is made public. "This hypothesis
implies that investors who base their decisions on any important
new information"a.fter it is public should not derive aboveaverage risk-adjusted profits from their transactions" (Reilly &
Brown, 2003). There is much disparity in the academic world as
to whether the market truly is efficient at any level (strong, semistrong, or weak) and is still up for debate. IfFama is correct and
stock prices fully reflect publicly available information, then
there is no opportunity for individual investors to try to find gains
in trading securities. Regardless of the academic support for
EMH, the actions of many investors reveal that they believe
market inefficiencies do exist and that there are opportunities for
abnormal gains. While many believe that investors are naive to
think they can actually beat the market because of its efficiency
(Tam, 2002), individuals continue to tune in daily to Cramer's
Mad Money looking for an advantage to do just that-beat the
market.
The efficient market hypothesis was first developed by
Eugene Fama in 1965. He states that "in an efficient market,
competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a
situation where ... actual prices of individual securities already
reflect the effects of information based ... on events that have
already occurred" (1970). Fama's theory launched anew way of
thinking about economic markets and led to much controversy.
Perhaps the one puzzle in the discovery of whether the efficient
market theory holds is whether investors really are intelligent as
Fama surmises.
In his paper, Daniel (1999) asserts that "self-confident
individuals will appear to be more competent than individuals
who are insecure about their own abilities." Jim Cramer presents
himself as a self-confident individual. It is no wonder that
investors catch on to this intoxicating energy and trust in his
interpretations of market information. Could Cramer be too
confident? Daniel supports his argument saying that
overconfidence can have both a direct and indirect impact on
how individuals process information. If investors adopt his
overconfident attitude, they could overweight his suggestions
and neglect to search their own base of knowledge to make the
most intelligent investment decision. However, if they jump on
the bandwagon too quickly they are not accurately following
Cramer's advice. Cramer advises his viewership to "do their
homework" and research a company before making the decision
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to buy the stock. This paper contends that regardless of following
his do-your-homework advice, investors can gain positive returns
by following his 1-want-you-to-buy-this-stock advice-perhaps
investors are more intelligent than originally surmised if they arc
already trading with Cramer's stock recommendations.

2. Results ofOtlzer Event Studies
Event studies are used to examine abnormal returns
surrounding a particular economic event and provide a test for
the EMH. Popular event study topics for testing semi-strong
market efficiency theory include stock splits, initial public
offerings (IPOs), exchange listings, unexpected world events
and economic news, announcements of accounting changes. and
corporate events. According to Reilly and Brown (2003) the
evidence from tests of the semi-strong EMH draws mixed
conclusions. Numerous event studies on a range of topics like
stock splits, exchange listings, and initial public offerings provide
support while numerous studies on predicting the expected
return over time or for a cross section of stocks actually provide
evidence count to semi-strong efficiency.
However, there are multiple event studies that offer evidence
to counter semi-strong market efficiency. One such study is that
of Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2006). They find that
Cramer's recommendations do have an effect on stock prices in
the short run concluding that Cramer's show caused mispricing
in the market. Their findings document the existence of
inefficiencies in the market-negating the semi-strong form
market efficiency hypothesis. However, this study's findings
differ from those of Engelberg, et al. because this study
differentiates between the different portions of the television
programs. This study also uses TheStreet.com as the primary
data source, but Engelberg et al. used a different second-hand
source other than the Personal Finance Blog discussed later in the
paper.
Two additional studies that tested the value of investment
advice looked at the recommendations made through the Heard
on the Streets (HOTS) column in the Wall Street Joumal. The
first study was conducted by Davies and Canes (1978). They
study the recommendations presented in the HOTS articles and
found that the dissemination of information from a primary
source (the analysts) to a public format can significantly affect
stock prices. As a follow up to this study. Liu, Smith. and Syed
( 1990) extend the study using a more recent sample. They also
find that investment advice has economic value due to the
observed abnormal returns for both buy and sell recommendations
on the day of articles publication.
3. Cramer's Reviews
After Cramer graduated from Harvard in 1977, he began
work as a journalist at the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. He
returned to Harvard, received his Juris Doctor degree, and took
a position with Goldman Sachs' Sales and Trading department.
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He began his own hedge fund company (Cramer Berkowitz)
with his partner Jeff Berkowitz in 1987. Though his hedge fund
was hugely successful, Cramer left in 2000 citing angermanagement and stress issues as the dominant factor to his
decision. Shortly after leaving Cramer Berkowitz, he began
appearing as a host on'America Now and Kudlow & Cramer.
After Kudlow & Cramer, Cramer began his own show which
mixed his reputation for an anger-management problem and his
stellar stock-picking record into a dynamite television program
that has soared to the top of the charts.
Cramer's Mad Money came under scrutiny on June 19,
2005, when the New York Post printed an article by Richard
Wilner entitled "Smart 'Money'? Cramer's Bark Worse Than
Bite." The article explained that while Cramer's show is
entertaining, it is not the best investment advice. Cramer
responded to this article by offering his own,"'Cramer's Mad
Money Record Speaks for Itself." In his article, Cramer provides
the first week's worth of his recommendations and their results.
He wraps up the article by saying"'I thought you would enjoy the
actuals, though, and you might conclude that my bite and my
bark are both pretty effective." The first week's worth of
recommendations did look impressive, but that was not enough
to keep those who doubt Cramer's success at bay.
On February 27, 2006 TheStreet.com revealed that it and
Cramer had received a subpoena from the SEC in response to
stock manipulation allocations made by Overstock.com's CEO
Peter Byrnes (Byrnes denied he was behind the SEC probe). The
accusation is that a group of hedge fund managers and journalists
conspired to drive down the stock price in order to gain from the
stock's fall in price. Cramer responded by saying he was the
target of the investigation because '·I said the stock was going
lower. I didn't get the subpoena because I'm corrupt, I got it
because I tried to get people out of a stock that we said was going
lower. and went lower." He subsequently wrote bull on the
subpoena and dropped it on the floor.

Hypotheses Developmmt
Based on the analysis of current literature and other relevant
event studies. two hypotheses for this test were developed. The
first hypothesis is as follows.

Ho: investors can not gain above-average, riskadjusted returns for the 5 and 26 day trading
windows by following the recommendations
made by Jim Cramer during his CNBC show
Mad Money

H 1: investors can gain above-average, riska~justed returns f~r the 5 and 26 day trading

\\'111dows bywatchingMad Money and following
the stock recommendations

Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2006

The second hypothesis was made by further dividing the
data and distinguishing between when the recommendation was
made during the program-either lightning round or non-lightning
round. The hypothesis for this division was developed as
follows.

Ho: regardless of when the recommendation
was made during the program, investors cannot
expect to gain above-average, risk-adjusted
returns for the 5 and 26 day trading windows

H 1: the two different segments of the program
can gain the investor differing levels of aboveaverage, risk-adjusted returns for the 5 and 26
day trading windows when one considers
whether the recommendation was a buy or sell
Sample selection and study design:
The data for this test was collected from two internet data
sources. The first and most reliable is TheStreet.com, a website
co-founded by Jim Cramer. This website provides recaps of the
daily shows from the most recent date back to June 28, 2005. For
data earlier than June 28, I relied on the Personal Finance Blog
(PFBlog.com) where a faithful viewer reviews in detail Cramer's
daily recommendations. The variables I considered were the
date of each show, company name, Cramer's position on the
stock, and whether he was recommending the stock during the
normal show time or the adrenaline-pumped lightning round.
The data collection required some subjective decision making.
In instances when it was difficult to distinguish, I relied on my
ability to read his comments and decide whether he was bullish
or bearish on the stock. The rule of thumb used was if he spoke
about the stock in a positive light, it received a "buy"
recommendation-alternatively, negative spins on a stock
received a "sell" recommendation.
The next step was to define the window of time. Since the
show has only been on the air for a little over a year, the analysis
would have to be short-term. This being the case, the decision
was made to focus the analysis on 26-day trading window (five
days prior to the event and twenty days after). Since Mad Money
is a daily show, Cramer will often times repeat his recommendation
for a stock within the created constraint of 25 days. Therefore,
the process then became to remove "doubled-up"
recommendations that could skew the results. Repeated
recommendations were deleted unless Cramer changed his views
on the stock, up to 25 days after the initial recommendation.
After the 26-day window, the same recommendation on a stock
was considered a unique event and included in the analysis.
After controlling for repetition, there were 3,550 observations.
The time period extended from Aprill9 to November 30, 2005.
The data could not be extended beyond its end date since 20 days
after the trade recommendation were required for the analysis.
Also, data on stock prices and indices were only available
through 2005.
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After the time period of the study was established, the
second set of data needed to be collected. This portion of the
study included finding the stock returns for each company in
Cramer's basket of recommendations as well as the returns for
the value-weighted index, the proxy for the market's return.
Through the University of Arkansas's subscription to Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS) the returns were accessed for
the value-weighted index using datasets from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The value-weighted daily
returns include all distributions, on a value-weighted market
portfolio (excluding American Depository Receipts (ADRs)).
All returns were found for the 26-day trading window.
Since the alternative hypotheses of this paper are that
investors can expect to earn above-average risk-adjusted returns,
the daily returns of each stock had to be adjusted for the returns
an investor could expect to make from investing in a portfolio of
the market during the same time period. The cumulative abnormal
returns were calculated for each of the 26 days surrounding the
event as:
Cumulative Abnormal Return== Portfolio Returnt
- Return on Value-Weightedlndext(wheret=O
is the recommendation event)
The data underwent two tests of significance for the two
time periods evaluated for the existence of short-term abnormal
gains one could make from watching Mad Money.
The first test looked at the entire 26-day trading window (5
days before the event, the day of, and 20 days after). The second
time period was forthe five days surrounding the recommendation
event (two days before, the day of, and two days after). Tables
I and 2 summarize the observations for the two time periods and
the two tests for each hypothesis (buy and sell only and lightning
round vs. non-lightning round). From the study, one can conclude
that Jim Cramer's stock recommendations made during his
television program, Mad Money, can gain investors cumulative
abnormal returns.

Results:
The conclusion that investors can gain above-average,
risk-adjusted returns is statistically significant at a 95'7c level of
confidence. The variables were tested twice for the given
hypotheses. The variables for the first test were all buy and sell
recommendations. These variables were significantly different
from each other with a p-value of less that 0.000 I for both time
periods. The second set of tests determined the significant
difference of lightning round buy and sell recommendations and
non-lightning round buy and sell recommendations. For the 5day period variables were found to be significantly different
from each other with p-values less than 0.000 I for all variables.
The 26-day time period found statistically significant differences
for all variables with the followingp-values: 0.0042 for lightning
round buy vs. lightning round sell and 0.0002 for non-lightning
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round buy vs. non-lightning round sell. The final test compared
lightning round and non-lightning round recommendations.
These tests were significantly different at a 95% level of
confidence only for the 5-day time period with p-values of less
than 0.0001 for buys and 0.0059 for sells. Table 3 summarizes
the significant difference for the variables in each time period
test.
Investors can earn abnormal returns from following
Cramer's trading advice. They can expect to gain the highest
returns by following his recommendations for a position on a
stock during the non-lightning round portion of his show. Fort he
26-window trading period, this class of recommendations
averaged a 2.4% cumulative abnormal return as opposed to 1.4%
fornon-lightning round recommendations. Sell recommendations
made during the regular part of the show averaged -1.2%-for
non-lightning round sell recommendations, the CAR was just
over0.25%. The largestCAR(3.6%) occurred two days aftcrthe
recommendation event for buys on stocks recommended during
the non-lightning round portion. The second largest was the day
before, or one day after the announcement. Following the second
day, returns slowly begin to decrease dropping by a total of I%
by the twenty-fifth trading day in the study for non-lightning
round buy recommendations. Figure I illustrates the variables
and cumulative abnormal returns.
Another phenomenon witnessed within theses tests was
that the CAR for the recommendations increases initially before
the day of recommendation. There are many possible reasons
why this is the case. One is that Cramer bases his recommendations
off of the market news-information that is publici y availableand the market is adjusting for this public information. Another
possibility is that there is a leak in information. This conclusion
concerns the idea that Cramer's recommendations actually affect
the stock price which is a consideration that should be looked
into in the future. The leak, therefore, means that investors trade
with the expectation of being able to ride the change in stock
price due to Cramer's recommendation. Regardless of the
reason, investors are still able to gain returns thanks to Cramer's
recommendations.

Sensitivity Analysis/Robustness Check:
For robustness. equally-weighted daily returns, including
all distributions on an equally-weighted market portfolio
(including ADRs), were also collected from CRSP. The
cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for each of the 26
days surrounding the event as:
Cumulative Abnormal Return= Portfolio Return,
-Return on Equally-Weighted Index,
(where t=O is the recommendation event)
Conclusions drawn from new test-; using this index instead
of the Value-weighted index were similar to those based on the
value-weighted index.
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Conclusion:
The energy of Cramer's show is invigorating. While his
enthusiasm has developed many strong supporters and believers,
he has also managed to draw plenty of criticism for his personal
style and investment advice. He maintains, though, that the
objective of the show is to make people money. As long as he
remains loyal to the show's original purpose, he is doing his job
to the bestofhisability. The resultsofthis study supportjustthat.
There are some shortcomings of this study, though that could
potentially diminish the returns an investor can expect to make.
These factors include considerations like transaction costs and
time concerns. Taking these factors into consideration could
absolve any abnormal returns observed in the study.

the development of a hedge fund strategy based off of this
assessment.

Author's note:

Even with the above considerations, the findings that
investors can expect to gain above-average, risk-adjusted returns
by following Cramer's recommendations on' Mad Money make
a contribution to the research on the semi-strong form market
efficiency hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds firm, investors
can not expect to gain cumulative abnormal returns trading on
information after it is made public-the information is already
priced into the stock. However, this paper contends that not only
can investors find gains in an inefficient market but they can gain
these returns by following the recommendations made by Jim
Cramer during his show Mad Money. Other studies, such as that
conducted by a group of academics at Northwestern, also find
that Cramer is able to provide investors with gains over those of
the market. The findings of this paper, coupled with that of
Northwestern, provide additional support that the market is not
operating at a semi-strong form of market efficiency. These
findings make contributions to the current literature by providing
information about the returns gained from the different portions
of the show. There are also implications for future research into

I wish to thank the following people for their dedication and
support throughout this long and sometimes stressful proce~s.
Thanks for making my last semester a memorable and worthwhile
experience: Dr. Craig Rennie, John Norwood, Jeff Jones, Candice
Norton, Rivka Berman, Gary Schubert, Leslie Lemiso, and
Susannah Rodgers.
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Table 1: Description of Data for 5-day and 26-day Trading Window Buy and Sell Recommendations Only Value-Weighted
Index:
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the entire data set. The two variables considered in this test were the cumulative
abnormal returns for all buy and sell recommendations made by Cramer during Mad Money television broadcasts from Aprill9, 2005
to November 30. 2005. Stock recommendations that were repeated within the 25-day limit are not included in the sample. The two
time periods tested-the 5-day and 26-day trading windows-are represented in the following table.
Recommendation
Sell

Variable
CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

N
1661

Mean
-0.0029
0.0045

Median
-0.0023
0.0043

Std Dev
0.0663
0.1381

Minimum
-0.5864
-0.8182

Buy

CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

1889

0.0155
0.0214

0.0073
0.0152

0.0625
0.1092

-0.1945
-Q.5453

Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2006

Maximum
0.5713
1.0170
0.8581
0.8467
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Table 2: Description of Data for 5-day and 26-day Trading Window Buy /Sell Recommendations and Lightning Round
vs. Non-Lightning Round Value-Weighted Index
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the entire data set. The four variables considered in this test were the cumulative
abnormal returns for buy and sell recommendations made during lightning round and non-lightning segments for Mad Money
broadcasts from Aprill9, 2005 to November 30,2005. Stock recommendations that were repeated within the 25-day limit arc not
included in the sample. The two time periods tested-the 5-day and 26-day trading windows-arc represented in the following table.
N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Minimum

Sell/Non-lightning Round CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

Recommendation

Variable

143

-0.0170
-0.0174

-0.0041
-0.0093

0.1034
0.1670

-0.5864
-0.8062

0.4065
0.5735

Sell/Lightning Round

1518

-0.0016
0.0065

-0.0021
0.0050

0.0616
0.1350

-0.3081
-0.818

0.5713
1.0170

Buy/Non-lightning Round CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

473

0.0335
0.0268

0.0168
0.0206

0.0830
0.1201

-0.1945
-0.5453

0.8581
0.7738

Buy/Lightning Round

1416

0.0094
0.0196

0.0040
0.0127

0.0526
0.1052

-0.1860
-0.4348

0.6370
0.8467

CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

Maximum

Table 3: Test of Significant Difference for Cumulative Abnormal Returns Value-Weighted Index
This table provides a summary of the test of significance for the variables under the two tests of the hypotheses. Panel A refers
to the test for the first hypothesis (whether investors can gain cumulative abnormal returns by following the recommendations made
by Jim Cramer during Mad Money). The remaining panels offer evidence for the second hypothesis (the returns investors can expect
to gain are dependent upon during which segment of Mad Money the recommendation is made). The two time periods tested-the
5-day and 26-day trading windows-are represented in the following table.
Panel A: All Buy and All Sell Recommendations
Variable

CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

N

Buy

Sell

3550
3550

0.0157
0.0214

-0.0029
0.0045

Panel B: Lightning Round Buy and Sell Recommendations
Variable

CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

N

Buy

Sell

2934
2934

0.0094
0.0196

-0.0016
0.0065

Panel C: Non-lightning Round Buy and Sell Recommendations
Variable

CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

N

Buy

616
616

0.0335
0.0268

Sell

-0.0170
-0.0174

Difference

p-value

0.0184
0.0169

<.0001
<.0001

Difference

p-value

0.0110
0.0131

<.0001
0.0042

Difference

p-value

0.0504
0.0441

<.0001
0.0002
Panel D:

Lightning Round Buy vs. Non-lightning Round Buy Recommendations
Variable

CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

N

1889
1889

Lightning
Round

Non-lightning
Round

0.0094
0.0196

0.0335
0.0268

Difference

-0.0240
-0.0072

Panel E: Lightning Round Sell vs. Non-lightning Round Sell Recommendations
Variable

CAR for 5 days
CAR for 26 days

N

1661
1661

p-value

<.0001
0.2730

Lightning
Round

Non-lightning
Round

Difference

p-value

-0.0016
0.0065

-0.0170
-0.0174

0.0154
0.0239

0.0059
0.0271
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 5-day and 26-day Trading Window Value-Weighted Index
This figure provides a visual interpretation of the data analyzed in the study. The time period analyzed is five da~s b~fore the
recommendation event and twenty days after. The recommendation event day is time 0. The six variables represented Ill ~h1s figure
are the two for the first hypothesis (whether investors can gain abnormal returns) which are all buy and sell recommendations m~de
and the four variables for the second hypothesis (the amount of gain investors can expect to gain depends on when the recommendatiOn
was given during the show) which are buy and sell recommendations made during lightning round and non-lightning round portions
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Mentor comments:
Dr. Craig Rennie made the following remarks about Ms.
Dodson's research:
As Elizabeth Dodson's thesis advisor, I strongly
recommend Elizabeth's research on Jim Kramer's
Mad Money recommendations for publication in
Inquiry. Her paper makes a material contribution to
the empirical investments finance literature dealing
with efficient markets and asset pricing by
investigating the effectiveness of investment
recommendations made bv the immenselv successful
CNBC investments com~entator of a hit TV show.
Traditionally, there has been debate in the academic
investments finance literature about semi-strong form
market efficiency. Prior literature generally shows
investments recommendations from newsletters and
other commentators generate marginally superior
returns, but not necessarily after transaction costs are
·
taken into account.
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Elizabeth's research extends this work in a new way
by investigating the effectiveness of recommendations
made by a widely followed CNBC commentator who
is a highly experienced former hedge fund manager.
Only one other working paper exists on this topic, but
it fails to differentiate between Jim Kramer's own
recommendations and his commentary in the
"lightning round" where he responds to questions
from call-ins. Elizabeth notes that Jim Kramer's
recommendations could predict stock price
movements, or cause stock price movements. \Vhat
matters to investors is that his recommendations can
be used to achieve abnormal stock returns.
Importantly, Elizabeth's findings of almost a 3 percent
abnormal return over a short term holding period are
striking. Her research can be used by investors to
realize abnormal stock returns. Her results also cast
furtherdoubtonthesemi-strongformeffidentmarkets
hypothesis.
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